政府推动再制造产业发展的演化博弈策略研究

中国机械工程

政府推动再制造产业发展的演化博弈策略研究

郑汉东1,2;陈意1;李恩重2;桑凡2;史佩京2;徐滨士2

1.合肥工业大学管理学院，合肥，230009
2.陆军装甲兵学院装备再制造技术国防科技重点实验室，北京，100072

出版日期:2018-02-10 发布日期:2018-02-02
基金资助:
国家重点研发计划资助项目(2017YFF0207905);
国家自然科学基金资助重大项目(71690235);
中国科协高端科技创新智库青年项目(DXB-2016-015)
National Key Research and Development Program（No. 2017YFF0207905）
National Natural Science Foundation of China （No. 71690235）

Research on Evolutionary Game Strategy of Promoting Development of Remanufacturing Industries by Government

ZHENG Handong1, 2;CHEN Yi1;LI Enzhong2;SANG Fan2;SHI Peijing2;XU Binshi2

1.School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei,230009
2.National Key Laboratory for Remanufacturing, Academy of Army Armored Force, Beijing,100072

Online:2018-02-10 Published:2018-02-02
Supported by:
National Key Research and Development Program（No. 2017YFF0207905）
National Natural Science Foundation of China （No. 71690235）

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对现阶段原始设备制造商（OEM）缺乏重视再制造的问题，建立了政府与OEM发展再制造的演化博弈模型。结合再制造产业发展实际情况，分析了政府和OEM在不同策略下各自的成本和收益，运用演化博弈理论构建了政府与OEM双方博弈的复制者动态方程并分析了双方决策的动态演化过程，通过数值仿真演示了参数变化对演化结果的影响。结果表明，OEM是否选择再制造和再制造企业占比与政府激励力度有关，较高的再制造投资成本和（或）较低的再制造收益会阻碍OEM开展再制造，若OEM再制造吸引的产业链投资能够给政府带来较大规模的收益，地方政府将加大支持再制造的力度。

关键词: 政府推动, 原始设备制造商, 再制造, 演化博弈

Abstract: For the problems of lack of emphasis on remanufacturing by OEM at the present stage, an evolutionary game model was constructed to study the development of remanufacturing promoted by OEM and government. Combined with current situations of China remanufacturing industries, the costs and profits of different strategies for government and OEM were analyzed. The replicator dynamics equations of government and OEMs were established based on evolutionary game theory and the dynamic evolution processes of decisions were analyzed. The influences of parameter variations on the evolution results were demonstrated by numerical simulations. The results show that whether OEMs do remanufacturing is related to the proportions of remanufacturing enterprise and incentive powers. A higher remanufacturing investment cost and (or) the lower profit will be prevented OEM from carrying out remanufacturing. Local government will offer incentives to support OEM remanufacturing when extraneous income from remanufacturing industrial investment is up to a point. Finally, initial proportion of strategies for both OEMs and local government, remanufacturing investment costs and benefits, incentive costs and additional benefits were analyzed through the numerical simulations. It is benefit for OEMs and local government to take appropriate measures for the development of remanufacturing.

Key words: government driving, original equipment manufacturer(OEM), remanufacturing, evolutionary game

中图分类号:

F272.3

郑汉东1,2;陈意1;李恩重2;桑凡2;史佩京2;徐滨士2. 政府推动再制造产业发展的演化博弈策略研究[J]. 中国机械工程.

ZHENG Handong1, 2;CHEN Yi1;LI Enzhong2;SANG Fan2;SHI Peijing2;XU Binshi2. Research on Evolutionary Game Strategy of Promoting Development of Remanufacturing Industries by Government[J]. China Mechanical Engineering.

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