基于随机回收和有限库存的逆向供应链决策分析

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

针对逆向供应链成员企业库存容量有限的问题,构建了由制造商和回收商构成的二级逆向供应链模型。综合考虑制造商再制造率、回收商努力程度和政府奖惩补贴等因素,分别讨论了Stackelberg博弈和集中式决策下双方的决策行为,其中Stackelberg博弈考虑制造商和回收商分别租用第三方库存两种情况。通过算例分析了决策变量和第三方库存设施对逆向供应链各企业收益的影响。研究结果表明:在第三方库存条件一定时,集中式决策优于Stackelberg博弈;在分散式决策下,与回收商负责租用第三方库存相比,制造商租用第三方库存可使各方决策更优，并能使供应链整体效益更高。

关键词: 逆向供应链, 再制造, 第三方库存, Stackelberg博弈, 集中式决策

Abstract:

A two-echelon RSC system containing a manufacturer and a recycler was established with considering the factors of remanufacturing rate, collection effort and subsidies when facing the limitation of inventory capacity. For the two cases that the manufacturer or the recycler rented a facility, the optimal decision-making was analyzed under Stackelberg game and centralized decision in RSC. The relationships between the members' expected profits and various parameters as well as third-party facility were discussed by numerical simulations. The results indicate that the system benefit under centralized decision is optimal compared with Stackelberg game, and it can obtain better decisions as well as the system benefit when the manufacturer rents the facility instead of the recycler.

Key words: reverse supply chain(RSC), remanufacturing, third-party inventory, Stackelberg game, centralized decision

中图分类号:

TB11
N941

曹柬, 陈雅, 张雪梅. 基于随机回收和有限库存的逆向供应链决策分析[J]. 中国机械工程, 2014, 25(10): 1387-1394.

Cao Jian, Chen Ya, Zhang Xuemei. Decision Analysis in Reverse Supply Chain under Random Collection Quantity and Capacity Constraints[J]. China Mechanical Engineering, 2014, 25(10): 1387-1394.

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